Category: Laws

Laws

Non-Governmental Organisations and National Human Rights Institutions monitoring the execution of Strasbourg Judgments: An Empirical Perspective on Rule 9 Communications

Abstract

This article considers a scarcely explored perspective in relation to the execution of judgments of the ECtHR, notably, the formal involvement of NGOs and NHRIs. Rule 9(2) of the Committee of Minister Rules’ allows NGOs and NHRIs to participate in the supervision process for the execution of the Court’s judgments by submitting reports (Communications) in which these actors review and assess domestic authorities’ performance with respect to judgment execution. On the basis of interviews with important stakeholders, this article provides an all-round user-based perspective of this Rule 9 mechanism and its perceived impact. Doing so elucidates whether the Rule 9 procedure allows NGOs and NHRIs to engage in the important cycle of reporting and pressuring for change, the conclusions of which are important in assessing if and how Rule 9 works to advance the execution of judgments of the ECtHR.

Laws

Human Rights Protections in Drawing Inferences from Criminal Suspects’ Silence

Abstract

This article sheds comparative and contextual light on European and international human rights debates around the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence. It does so through an examination of adverse inferences from criminal suspect’s silence in three European jurisdictions with differing procedural traditions: Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. The article highlights the manner in which adverse inferences have come to be drawn at trial in the three jurisdictions, despite the existence of both European and domestic legal protections for the right to silence. It also explores differing approaches to the practical operation of inference-drawing procedures, including threshold requirements, varying evidential uses of silence and procedural safeguards. The authors argue that human rights’ standard-setting institutions ought to provide clarity on the conditions under which adverse inferences may be tolerated, including the purpose(s) for which inferences may be used, and the necessary surrounding safeguards.

Laws

Breastfeeding in Refugee Camps: A Child and Maternal Right?

Abstract

In recognition of the health benefits breastfeeding offers for both mother and child, breastfeeding has been acknowledged in various International Human Rights Law instruments. Furthermore, against the backdrop of aggressive formula milk marketing campaigns, significant soft law provisions contained within the International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes 1981 regulate and control the promotion of breastmilk substitutes. Refugee camps, however, remain aligned with pre-code practice, as formula milk is often one of the first donations to arrive in camps. Mothers, who are still affected by historical formula marketing campaigns, receive formula milk and perceive its availability and distribution as an endorsement over breastfeeding. In this article, International Human Rights Law is analysed, within the framework of the principle of the best interests of the child, to determine if the choice to breastfeed should be protected as a human right and how the indiscriminate supply of formula milk interacts with this choice in refugee camps.

Laws

Abstract but Concrete, or Concrete but Abstract? A Guide to the Nature of Advisory Opinions under Protocol No 16 to the ECHR

Abstract

In constitutional adjudication, a well-known distinction exists between abstract and concrete review. Under abstract review, a court evaluates a rights interference detached from any particular application to the facts of a case. Under concrete review, the review arises as an element of adjudication of specific facts. In this contribution, we explain theoretically how this distinction plays both at the macro level of a review system and the micro level of specific cases. These concepts are then used to explore and understand the advisory procedure recently introduced by Protocol No 16 to the European Convention on Human Rights. We argue that this mechanism theoretically provides for a type of review that is more abstract than the review exercised under the European Court of Human Rights’ contentious jurisdiction, yet still allows for important elements of concreteness to enter the analysis. This is confirmed by Advisory Opinions Nos 1 and 2.