The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has published its much-awaited General Comment No. 25 on children’s rights in the digital environment in 2021. Much of the conversations since its adoption have centred on how General Comment No. 25 influences State behaviours in the western world or globally. Little attention has been given as to what General Comment No. 25 means for children’s right to privacy in Africa. This article seeks to explore the role of General Comment No. 25 in clarifying States’ obligations in respect of children’s rights to privacy and data protection in the digital era on the African continent. In doing so, this article first contextualises General Comment No. 25 in the broader context of the United Nations human rights system and analyses its recommendations on children’s right to privacy. Second, the article examines children’s right to privacy in Africa and analyses the specific features of the African human rights system that influence the understanding of this right. Finally, the article illuminates certain child-specific privacy and data protection measures that are being or have been included or discussed in the law-making processes and policy debates in a selection of African countries and links them to both General Comment No. 25 and the socio-cultural context of the continent.

This article examines the European Court of Human Rights’ approach towards restrictions on expression glorifying terrorist violence. This is done by situating the Court’s case law against two objections to respective criminal offences: their inherent overbreadth and their incompatibility with the restraining demands of the ‘harm principle’. In doing so, the article discusses how the ‘harm principle’ relates to the proportionality test and how the Court’s categorisation of expression glorifying violence responds to the objection of overbreadth. In arguing that the tool of categorisation has not been determinative in driving the outcomes in relevant decisions, the article suggests that engaging the existence of a competing public interest and reviewing the admissibility of reasons for such restrictions would appropriately elevate the Convention standard. Finally, the article argues that inconsistencies across decisions are best explained by the Court’s deference-giving practices, particularly in cases involving claims about the recency of terrorist violence.

The shift towards human rights is a cornerstone of contemporary labour law scholarship. However, the debate primarily follows a naturalistic approach, heavily reliant on an orthodox account of human rights as universal moral claims for all individuals. This article challenges this approach, arguing that it frames the debate in an antagonistic and compartmentalized manner, where the two legal domains are seen as distinct and homogeneous. By adopting a political approach, the article proposes framing the interactions between these legal realms through the notion of legal-conflict constellations, wherein labour-capital conflicts manifest as specific social problems that may be addressed, wholly or partially, through rights discourse. These legal-conflict constellations are built around three interconnected processes: politicization, recentring class and the formation of productive resistance alliances. The article makes the following contributions. First, it situates the debate within the broader context of the reshaping of labour law under neoliberalism. Second, it sheds light on the prevailing naturalistic approach and its shortcomings. Third, it proposes a political approach to the debate, advancing a framework to explore the intricate links between these legal fields.

Control and access to land are major concerns for peasants of the global south who face the longstanding consequences of colonialism and recent ‘land-rush’. What is the role of human rights in this peasant struggle? The UNDROP marks the international recognition of the right to land. However, as the very project of human rights is facing criticism and the effectiveness of this recognition remains uncertain, the question of whether using the human rights framework is even desirable arises. Arguing for a broader understanding of the actors and processes involved in the application and evolution of human rights, I explain that the process of obtaining the recognition of the right to land involved the mobilisation and re-modelling of human rights by grassroots organisations. I explore the potential of this mobilisation to transform common understandings of human rights, and its distinctive ability to support the necessary paradigm shift to transform peasants’ lives.