Category: Laws

Laws

Containment Instead of Refoulement: Shifting State Responsibility in the Age of Cooperative Migration Control?

Abstract

Containment policies whereby destination States provide funding, equipment and training to transit States that intercept refugees on their behalf suggest that destination States try to circumvent the prohibition of refoulement and raise the question to what extent destination States can avoid responsibility for violations of the rights of migrants and refugees by cooperating with transit States. Answering this question requires broadening the analysis beyond the principle of non-refoulement, including not only international human rights law, especially the right to leave and the concept of jurisdiction, but also the law of State responsibility, notably the prohibition of complicity. This article argues that, although it remains debatable whether the principle of non-refoulement applies when transit States intercept migrants and refugees on behalf of sponsoring destination States, the wider network of international law rules constrains the latter’s ability to avoid responsibility when implementing cooperative migration control policies.

Laws

Jam Tomorrow? Implications for United Nations Human Rights Liability of the United States Supreme Court’s Judgment on Immunity

human rightsinternational organisationsimmunityUnited NationsJam v International Finance Corp

Laws

Substantive and Procedural Criminal Law Protection of Human Rights in the Law of the European Convention on Human Rights

Abstract

This article seeks to examine and explain the interaction between the substantive and procedural aspects of criminal law protection of human rights in the law of the European Convention of Human Rights. Noting certain theoretical and conceptual lacunae that arise in this context, the article suggests the most appropriate solution for the assessment of the substantive-procedural relationship from the perspective of legal theory and the European Court of Human Rights’ case-law. It submits, in particular, that it is always necessary to examine both aspects—substantive and procedural—of the same right and that the procedural aspect should be given primacy both in terms of the order of examination and inferences to be drawn on the question of observance of human rights by states.