This article examines State practice on derogations from human rights protection during states of emergency under Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The article presents statistical data on the use of derogations, offers analysis of the data and practice and advances a series of reform proposals. It is argued that Article 15 is being misused by States to derogate for protracted periods of time for entrenched emergencies and that emergency measures are remaining in place after declared emergencies have ended. Equally, States are not derogating in circumstances where they should for military operations, particularly extra-territorial military operations. It is argued that the European Court of Human Rights has been deferential in enforcing Article 15 and that reform is needed to address the problems identified. Reforms should include review procedures for emergency measures, enhanced procedures for notifying derogations and an amendment to facilitate extra-territorial derogations.

The business and human rights framework is based on pillars in which states should act to protect against the human rights impacts of business enterprises and the business enterprises should act in ways that do not lead to human rights impacts. Yet there is a gap in this framework in situations where a business enterprise may be willing to act but faces challenges in doing so due to the laws and practices of a state in which it operates. This international framework nevertheless places an expectation on businesses that they should still respect international human rights law as far as possible in these circumstances. No methods are offered for how this can be done in any coherent manner. This makes it very difficult for business enterprises, regulators and civil society to determine the type of compliance required. In this article, we explore this gap in the international framework and, based on empirical research, offer ways in which it can be closed. We propose a typology to assist in understanding the different conflicts between business practices and state laws that may occur, and recommend methods as to how to deal with these conflicts.

According to Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the best interests of the child have to be a primary consideration in all cases concerning children. The Committee on the Rights of the Child understands Article 3(1) as a ‘threefold concept’: a substantive right, an interpretive principle and a rule of procedure. This article argues that the provision is best understood as a procedural obligation. Understanding Article 3(1) as a procedural obligation remedies key problems that originate from interpreting the provision as a substantive right. A significant strength of the procedural approach is that it can be consistently applied in different case groups. This article illustrates the argument with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights related to children, in which the article detects three layers of a procedural approach to the best interests of the child.

genocideprinciple of legalityArticle 7 European Convention on Human RightsDrelingas v Lithuania